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Abstract
This paper proposes a 2-sliding mode observer to detect and reconstruct a certain class of load altering
faults in a power network. The observer design is based on the recently proposed multivariable super-twisting
structure. The IEEE benchmark power networks used to test the scheme are modelled as a semi-explicit
class of differential algebraic equations (DAEs). For the purpose of developing the detection scheme, only the
phase angles of the generators are measured, which represent a subset of the differential states of the DAEs.
The objective is to estimate the differential states (the phase angles and frequencies of the generators), the
algebraic states (the phase angles of the load bus tensions) and to reconstruct a class of load altering faults
affecting the network. The proposed observer is assessed in simulation on two IEEE benchmarks: the 9-bus
and 14-bus networks, so as to verify its capability to correctly estimate the differential and algebraic states
of the network in spite of its complexity and uncertainty. Moreover, the capability of the proposed scheme
to detect the presence of a load altering fault, to exactly identify its position in the network, and to precisely
reconstruct the shape of the fault itself is shown and discussed.
1 Introduction
Infrastructures including power grids, water distribution networks and transport systems play an important
role in the 21st century and are becoming increasingly susceptible to disruptive attacks. In a power network,
a fault in one component or a deliberate malicious action (such as unregulated absorption of power) could
compromise the safe operation of the overall system. Such an event must be quickly identified, so that action
can be taken to mitigate the problem. In this paper power networks will be considered, although the ideas which
will be presented could be exploited in other applications. In particular, the faults considered in this paper
represent a variation of the power consumption at the load buses. This can arise in two different ways: (i) as an
unplanned increase in the power demand of a registered utility or as a load decrease due to an induction motor
detachment; (ii) as a result of a utility consuming more than the allowed amount of power or injecting power
into the network illegally. These actions affect the performance of the network, and therefore it is important
to detect their presence in order to avoid instability in the network itself.
In this paper, the network model comprises a differential component (the linearised swing dynamics as-
sociated with the generators) and an algebraic component, representing the DC power flow equations. The
resulting model is a set of semi-explicit differential algebraic equations (DAEs): that is a descriptor system [1].
Many different paradigms have been explored with the aim of creating a compact model for a power network;
formulations similar to the one exploited in this paper can be found, for example, in [2], [3] and [4].
Different observer paradigms for DAE systems can be found in the literature. Unknown input observers
have been used in [5] and [1] for linear descriptor systems in which the algebraic variables have been treated as
unknown inputs. A sliding mode observer for a descriptor system in which the inputs do not enter the algebraic
equations has been proposed in [6]; the observer design is based on the principle of singularly perturbed sliding
manifolds. A centralized Luenberger observer, designed through the graphical procedure described in [7], and
an H∞ observer, based on the ideas in [8], have been designed in [3] for large power networks modelled as
DAE systems. A class of sliding mode observers for descriptor systems is proposed and analysed in [9] and [10]
but, as highlighted in the following, these schemes are not suitable for the DAE model of the power network
when only phase angle measurements are available. Recently in [1], necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a Luenberger observer for an arbitrary order DAE were given, exploiting the concept of impulse
observability. This paper considers a 2-sliding mode observer exploiting super-twisting structures [11], [12].
The use of state estimators for the detection of faults or exogenous signals is common in power network
applications. In [13] a Kalman filter is used to estimate the state variables of a smart grid model, in order to
detect the presence of external attacks, such as Denial of Service. In [14], a hybrid observer is used to detect
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faults occurring in a class of switched linear systems, used to model power converters. In [15] an extended state
observer is used to estimate the load power, modelled as an external disturbance, of a grid connected power
converter. The scale of the problem considered in these two applications is different, as the focus is on a single
component of the power network, but the underlying strategy is the same.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a multivariable super-twisting sliding mode observer
for a class of semi-explicit DAE systems, used to model power networks. The proposed scheme is applied to
the 9 and 14 bus IEEE benchmark models [16], to highlight its adaptability. A reduced measurement set is
considered, assuming only the phase angles of the generators are measured. These measurements are shown
to be sufficient for the estimation of the entire state of the DAE system (including both the differential and
algebraic states) even in the presence of model parameter uncertainty. From these available measurements,
moreover, the detection, identification and reconstruction of exogenous signals, representing faults, is achieved.
The present scheme is inspired by the observer design proposed (for non DAE systems) in [17].
2 Problem Definition and System Description
The aim is to design an observer able to estimate the complete state vector of the DAE system representing
the power network, and to detect the presence and reconstruct the ‘shape’ of load altering faults. Load altering
faults can be interpreted as the unregulated consumption or production of power: they were originally defined
in [4], and later studied in [18]. In this paper it is assumed that only a single failure/attack can occur at a
particular time, i.e., simultaneous different faults are precluded. Although this is a restriction, it is in line with
[19].
A network composed of ng generators and nl load buses is considered. The i−th generator is modelled
through the swing dynamics [3], which is the differential equation representing Newton’s second law expressed
in rotational form. The swing dynamics is given by:
miδ¨i + diδ˙i − Pgi = −
∑
j∈Ni
Pij (1)
where δi is the i
th generator phase angle and δ˙i is its voltage frequency, mi and di are the coefficients of inertia
and damping, Pgi is the mechanical input power at the i
th generator and Pij is the flow of active electrical
power between node i and its neighbouring nodes j ∈ Ni [3]. The neighbourhood set Ni includes the indices of
the buses directly linked to the ith node through a line; consequently the topology of the network is embedded
in the dynamics.
A static model has been chosen for the load buses, which have been represented as a constant power
consumption Pli . Applying the principle of conservation of energy at each load bus, the flow of active/real and
reactive/imaginary power is described through:∑
j∈Ni
Pij(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
|Vi| |Vj | (Gij cos(ϑi − ϑj)+
+Bij sin(ϑi − ϑj)) + |Vi|2Gii (2)∑
j∈Ni
Qij(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
|Vi| |Vj | [Gij sin(ϑi − ϑj)−
−Bij cos(ϑi − ϑj)]− |Vi|2Bii (3)
where ϑi is the phase angle of the i
th load bus tension Vi [4]. Each line, connecting the i
th and jth nodes,
is characterized by a value of conductance Gij and susceptance Bij . In addition, Gii =
∑
j∈Ni −Gij and
Bii =
∑
j∈Ni −Bij . The quantities in (2) are expressed in p.u.: this refers to the ratio between the actual value
of the variable and a base or reference value. Usually, a base power and a base voltage are chosen, and reference
values for the other electrical quantities are derived. A set of standard assumptions, similar to those in [7],
[19], [20], [21], is introduced: (i) the value of the conductance Gij of each line can be neglected with respect to
the susceptance Bij ; (ii) small angle approximations can be applied throughout the network; (iii) the voltages,
expressed in p.u., are close to 1 p.u. and can be approximated by this value. A detailed discussion of these
hypotheses can be found in [2].
Since Gij is negligible ∀i, j, Vi = Vj = 1p.u. ∀i, j and Bii =
∑
j∈Ni −Bij , the right hand side of (3)
is approximately zero. Consequently, the reactive power flow is neglected and the active power flow can be
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(a) IEEE - 9 Bus Benchmark (b) IEEE - 14 Bus Benchmark
Figure 1: IEEE benchmarks and introduced faults
described through the following linearised small angle approximation:
Pli =
∑
j∈Ni
Pij(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
(Bij(ϑi − ϑj)) =
N∑
j=1
Lijϑj (4)
where N = ng + nl is the total number of buses in the network. The matrix L ∈ IRN×N is the weighted graph
Laplacian in which the topology of the network is embedded. The weights used to define the Laplacian L are
the susceptances of the network lines. For later use in the paper, the following partition of the matrix L is
introduced:
L =
[ Lgg Lgl
Llg Lll
]
(5)
where Lll ∈ IRnl×nl and the other matrices are partitioned accordingly. A set of algebraic state variables results
from the active power flow equations in (4): these are the phase angles of the load bus tensions (ϑi).
The state vector x(t) ∈ IRn, with n = 2ng + nl is given by
x(t):=
[
xd(t)
T | xa(t)T
]T
=
[
δ(t)T ω(t)T ϑ(t)T
]T
where xd(t) = [δ(t)
T ω(t)T ] ∈ R2ng is the differential state vector comprising the generator phase angles and
frequencies, while xa(t) = ϑ(t) ∈ Rnl is the algebraic state vector of the load bus tensions phase angles. The
resultant linearised dynamics encapsulating (1) and (4) can be written in the following compact form:
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + df(t), (6)
y(t) = Cx(t). (7)
The control input in (6) is
u(t) =
[
PTg P
T
l
]T ∈ IRng+nl
where Pg and Pl represent the input power at the ng generator buses and the consumed power at the nl load
buses respectively.
The matrix E ∈ IRn×n appearing in the left hand side of (6) is given by:
E =
[
Ed 0
0 0
]
=
 Ing 0 00 Mg 0
0 0 0
 , (8)
where Ed := Diag(Ing ,Mg) ∈ IRnd×nd is full rank, with nd = 2ng, and Mg = Diag(m1, . . .mng ) ∈ IRng×ng is
the diagonal matrix of generator inertia coefficients. Clearly Rank(E) = 2ng < n, and, as a consequence, E is
rank deficient. The DAE system is in semi-explicit form [22], as the algebraic states appear linearly in (6). In
(6) the system matrix
A =
[
Ad Ada
Aad Aa
]
=
 0 Ing 0−Lgg −Dg −Lgl
−Llg 0 −Lll
 , (9)
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where Dg = Diag(d1, . . . dng ) is the diagonal matrix of generator damping coefficients. The input and the fault
distribution matrices are as follows:
B =
[
BTd | BTa
]T
=
 0ng 0ng×nlIng 0ng×nl
0nl×ng Inl
 , (10)
d =
[
0
da
]
(11)
where da is a vector from the standard basis for IR
nl , i.e., of the form Col(0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) where the position of
the unitary element indicates the particular load bus affected by the fault. The structure in (11) reflects the
assumption that the faults are in the algebraic equations. Finally in (7)
C = [Cd 0nl ] =
[
Ing 0ng+nl
]
, (12)
which captures the fact that the differential states δ(t) are the only measured outputs; this strongly differentiates
the present work from [18, 19].
The descriptor model (6) - (7) is an approximation of the real system behaviour. Model uncertainty can be
captured by allowing the system matrices to vary inside a certain range [4]. In particular, uncertainty in the
generator parameters would result in a variation of the diagonal matrices Mg and Dg, while uncertainty on
the line parameters would result in a perturbation term affecting the corresponding entries of the matrix A
[7]. In what follows the initial conditions (x(0)) are assumed to satisfy the algebraic constraints, which are
related to the physics of the problem. The signal f(t) appearing in (6) is an unknown exogenous signal which
models a load altering fault acting in one of the algebraic channels associated with the load buses. In (6), the
vector d is linked to the channel in which the fault occurs, and is unknown. It is clear from (4) that changing
the phase angle of a load bus tension (ϑ) modifies the power flows in all the lines passing through that node.
Consequently, the entire network can be affected by a single fault.
Lemma 1 A necessary and sufficient condition for the triplet (C,E,A) in (6) - (7) to be impulse observable
is that the matrix Aa from (9) satisfies det(Aa) 6= 0.
Proof: It is shown in [1] that the triplet (C,E,A) is impulse observable if and only if:
Rank
 E A0 C
0 E

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
= Rank(E) + n. (13)
where n = 2ng + nl is the dimension of the state vector. Substituting for E,A and C from (8), (9) and (12):
Θ =

Ed 0 Ad Ada
0 0 Aad Aa
0 0 Cd 0
0 0 Ed 0
0 0 0 0
 (14)
where Cd =
[
Ing 0ng
]
. From (14), it can be seen that:
Rank(Θ) = Rank(Ed) +Rank
 Aad AaCd 0
Ed 0
 (15)
Since Rank(E) = Rank(Ed) and det(Ed) 6= 0, from (15):
Rank(Θ) = Rank(E) +Rank
([
0 Aa
Ed 0
])
(16)
Moreover:
Rank
([
0 Aa
Ed 0
])
= n ⇔ Rank(Aa) = nl
⇔ det(Aa) 6= 0
Hence necessary and sufficient conditions for (13) to be satisfied is that det(Aa) 6= 0.
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Figure 2: Convergence of the state estimations - 9-bus scenario
Remark 1 The condition det(Aa) 6= 0 is of course a restriction; however this assumption has been previously
made in [18]. From (9), Aa = −Lll and in power networks, this Laplacian sub-matrix is invertible [18]. Con-
sequently (A,E,C) is impulse observable.
Making use of the hypotheses and the structure in (8) - (12), the DAE in (6) and (7) can be rewritten as:
x˙d(t)=E
−1
d (Adxd(t)+Adaxa(t)+ Pg(t)) , (17)
0=Aadxd(t) +Aaxa(t) + Pl(t) + daf(t), (18)
y(t)=Cdxd(t). (19)
From the arguments above, det(Aa) 6= 0 and the algebraic states can be expressed as a function of the differential
states, the control inputs and the exogenous signals. Specifically, from (18):
xa(t) = A
−1
a (Aadxd(t) +Bau(t) + daf(t)) . (20)
The system in (17), (19) and (20) is a ‘collapsed model’. This reduced order system, in power network appli-
cations, is said to be the Kron-reduction of the descriptor power system model [18]. This is a system of index
‘1’ since the graph Laplacian matrix that embodies the topology of the network is irreducible because of the
assumed connectivity.
3 Multivariable super-twisting Sliding Mode Observer
The proposed observer for the DAE in (6) is:
Ez˙(t) = Az(t) +Bu(t) +Key(t) + Φ(ey(t)), (21)
where ey(t) := C(x(t)− z(t)) is the output estimation error and z(t) is the state estimate. The injection term
Φ(ey(t)) := Col(Φd(ey(t)), 0)
is a function of the output estimation error and Φd(ey(t)) ∈ IRnd . The observer gain matrix is assumed to be
of the form K := Col (Kd, 0) where Kd ∈ IRnd×ng is to be designed.
If the state estimation error for the DAEs is defined as e(t) := x(t) − z(t) = [ed(t)T , ea(t)T ]T , then
subtracting (21) from (6), the state estimation error dynamics satisfies
Ee˙(t) = Ae(t) + df(t)−Key(t)− Φ(ey(t)). (22)
The dynamics in (22) can be partitioned into differential and algebraic error states so that
Ede˙d(t) =Aded(t)+Adaea(t)−Kdey(t)− Φd(ey(t)) (23)
0 =Aaded(t) +Aaea(t) + daf(t). (24)
Since det(Aa) 6= 0, the error in the algebraic variable estimates, ea(t), can be evaluated, from (24), as:
ea(t) = −A−1a (Aaded(t) + daf(t)) . (25)
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Figure 3: Convergence of the state estimations - 14-bus scenario in presence of uncertainty in the plant
Substituting (25) in (23) yields
Ede˙d(t) =
(
Ad −AdaA−1a Aad
)
ed(t)−Kdey(t)−
−Φd(ey(t))−
(
AdaA
−1
a da
)
f(t). (26)
Let ed := (eδ, eω) where eδ ∈ IRng and eω ∈ IRng and define
Kd :=
[ −M−1g Dg + k2Ing
k4Mg − Lgg + LglL−1ll Llg +DgM−1g Dg − k2Dg
]
(27)
and
Φd(ey(t)) :=
 k1 ey(t)‖ey(t)‖ 12
−k1Dg ey(t)‖ey(t)‖ 12 + k3Mg
ey(t)
‖ey(t)‖
 (28)
for ey(t) 6= 0. Define f¯(t) =M−1g LglL−1ll daf(t), then from (8)-(12), equation (26) can be rewritten as:
e˙δ(t) = eω(t) +M−1g Dgeδ(t)− k2eδ(t)− k1
eδ(t)
‖eδ(t)‖ 12
(29)
e˙ω(t) = (k2M−1g Dg −M−1g DgM−1g Dg − k4I)eδ(t)− f¯(t)−
−M−1g Dgeω(t)+k1M−1g Dg
ey(t)
‖ey(t)‖ 12
− k3 eδ(t)‖eδ(t)‖ (30)
where ki > 0, for i = 1, . . . , 4. From the structure of C in (12), ey(t) ≡ eδ(t). Let e˜ω = eω +M−1g Dgeδ(t), then
the error dynamics can be written as:
e˙δ(t) = e˜ω(t)− k2eδ(t)− k1 eδ(t)‖eδ(t)‖ 12
(31)
˙˜eω(t) = −k4eδ(t)− k3 eδ‖eδ‖ − f¯(t) (32)
The following assumption is imposed [23].
Assumption 1 f¯(t) is bounded by a known constant η.
The introduction of Assumption 1 is possible as the signal f¯(t) only depends on the fault signal f(t) and not
on eδ or eω.
Theorem 1 For the error dynamics in (31) - (32), there exist positive scalar gains, k1, k2, k3 and k4, de-
pending on η such that eδ(t) = e˙δ(t) ≡ 0 in finite time and the origin is invariant for all subsequent time.
Proof : A sketch of the proof will be given. The representation in (31)-(32) is as special case of the structure
in [17]. The work in [17] proposes a set of inequalities for k1, k2, k3 and k4 in terms of η. These inequalities
guarantee that the function:
V (eδ, eω) = 2k3‖eδ‖+ k4eTδ eδ +
1
2
eTωeω +
1
2
ξT ξ (33)
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Table 1: Observer’s design parameters
η k1 k2 k3 k4
100 15 25 390 2625
where
ξ := k1
eδ
‖eδ‖1/2 + k2eδ − eω (34)
is a Lyapunov function for (31)-(32) which becomes identically equal to zero in finite time and remains at zero
[17]. From Lyapunov theory, it can be argued that eδ(t) = e˙δ(t) ≡ 0 in finite time and a 2-SM takes place. 
Remark 2 In the absence of a good estimation of η, the possibility of designing an adaptive super-twisting
sliding mode observer could be considered [24], [25].
Remark 3 A sliding mode observer for descriptor systems of the form (6)-(7) has been proposed in [9], [10],
assuming Rank ([ ET CT ]) = n. As a consequence, the application of these schemes to the current problem
is not possible since, from (8) and (12):
Rank ([ ET CT ]) = 2ng = n− nl < n
4 Fault Detection and Reconstruction
During the sliding motion, eδ = 0 and e˙δ = 0 and the unit vector component in (30) must on average take
a value to compensate for M−1g LglL−1ll daf(t). Writing the equivalent output error injection term as νeq(t),
equation (30), during sliding, takes the form:
νeq(t) +M−1g LglL−1ll︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
daf(t) = 0 (35)
A good approximation of νeq(t) ∈ IRng can be obtained in real time [26]. In (35), Ψ ∈ IRng×nl is known,
but both da and f(t) are unknown. When Ψ is a square matrix and hence (potentially) invertible, it is
straightforward to estimate the unknown failure daf(t) by multiplying both sides of (35) by Ψ
−1. However here
Ψ is not square, and hence not invertible. Consequently, the load altering fault is not easily estimated through
a linear combination of the equivalent injection signals νeq(t). However, an alternative estimation method can
be introduced: this three-stage method exploits the fault signature vector da. The first stage of the method is
fault detection, to identify the presence of the fault. The norm of the equivalent injection signal from (35) is
‖νeq‖ = ‖Ψda‖|f(t)|, and since da is a vector from the standard basis of IRnl , Ψda = Ψi ∈ IRng where Ψi is a
column of Ψ. If Ψi 6= 0, then ‖νeq‖ can be used as an indicator of the presence of a fault. Thus, fault detection
is achieved testing the condition:
‖νeq‖ ≥  (36)
where  is a positive design threshold used to trigger an alarm. The detection of the fault is followed by a) the
identification of the channel affected by the fault; and b) the reconstruction of the fault’s shape.
The fault identification procedure is based on directional characterization. A fault/attack on the ith load bus
is associated with the ith column of Ψ, that is Ψi. As a consequence, during this stage the aim is to identify
the column of Ψ that best matches the vector νeq(t) in terms of its direction cosine [27]. (Recall that a unitary
cosine value indicates perfect alignment between two vectors). Specifically, the fault channel is identified as
j := arg max
i=1...nl
(
|νTeq Ψi|
‖νeq‖‖Ψi‖
)
(37)
Table 2: Characterization of the faults introduced in the 9 and 14 buses scenarios
Fault 1 Fault 2 Fault 3
Fault Bus Interval (s) Signal Fault Bus Interval (s) Signal Fault Bus Interval (s) Signal
9 - bus fa(t) 4 2 - 7 Sine fb(t) 7 9 - 14 Ramp fc(t) 9 16 - 21 Step
Amplitude: 2 p.u. Slope:-0.4 Amplitude: 1.5 p.u.
Frequency: 1.5 Hz
14 - bus fi(t) 14 2 - 6 Step fj(t) 6 8 - 12 Sine fk(t) 10 14 - 18 Ramp
Amplitude: -1.2 p.u. Amplitude: 2 p.u. Slope: 0.3
Frequency: 1.5 Hz
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Figure 4: Fault reconstruction - 9-bus scenario
where j is the channel in which the failure is identified. As this procedure is applied only when the presence of
a fault has been detected, ‖νeq‖ >  (assuming that Ψi 6= 0), and hence j is well defined.
The final step of the method is fault reconstruction, aimed at reconstructing the shape of the signal f(t); this
is obtained through the expression: ∣∣∣fˆ(t)∣∣∣ := ‖νeq(t)‖‖Ψj‖ (38)
where fˆ(t) is the estimate of the fault f(t).
Remark 4 Consider the system in (6) - (7) with bounded uncertainty on the coefficients of inertia and damping
of the generators, ∆Mg and ∆Dg respectively. For the observer dynamics in (21), with control gains designed
as in (27) - (28), the error dynamics in (31)-(32) remains identical, except for an additional term in (32).
Through the analysis of the Lyapunov function in (33) it can be shown that, by an appropriately large choice of
the observer gains k1, . . . , k4, V˙ can be rendered negative and second order sliding obtained. The proposed state
estimation approach is thus robust with respect to uncertainties on the generator parameters. A similar result
holds for uncertainty in the line parameters, modelled as a bounded variation of the Laplacian matrix (5). Both
the generator and the line uncertainties have an effect on the fault identification and reconstruction procedure,
as they appear in (35). However, it may be possible to analyse the statistical properties of the injection term in
order to distinguish between model parameter uncertainties and load altering faults [28].
5 Simulation Results
In this section, a set of simulation results, obtained applying the observer design and the fault detection
and reconstruction scheme in a Matlab/Simulink environment, will be analysed. The 9-bus and 14-bus IEEE
benchmarks are shown in Figs. 1a and 1b respectively. Data for these networks is available in the MATPOWER
package for Matlab [16]. The 9-bus power network is composed of 3 generator buses (ng = 3) and 6 load buses
(nl = 6), whereas the 14-bus power network comprises 5 generator buses (ng = 5) and 9 load buses (nl = 9).
The simulations have been run applying the Euler integration method, with a fixed step of 10−4 seconds.
5.1 Observer design
Prior to analysing the results, some details about the super-twisting observer design procedure will be given.
The parameter η in Theorem 1 has been chosen as η = 100. Taking into account the constraints on the values
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Figure 5: Fault reconstruction - 14-bus scenario
of the design variables given in [17], the observer gains k1, . . . , k4 in (27) and (28) have been chosen as given in
Table 1. Having satisfied the algebraic constraints in [17] guarantees that eδ = e˙δ = 0 will be obtained in finite
time. The designed values, moreover, are conservative, rendering the observer robust enough to analyse both
the 9 and 14 bus networks.
5.2 Fault free scenario
Results from a fault free scenario are first analysed to assess the capability of the observer, designed as described
in Section 3, to correctly estimate the system state, exploiting the available measurements. Fig. 2 and Fig.
3 show the results obtained from the analysis of the 9 and the 14 bus networks respectively. The errors in
the estimation of the differential states, related to the generators, are shown in Fig. 2a and Fig. 3a, while
the estimation errors of the algebraic states, and thus the load phase angle estimations, are shown in Fig.
2b and Fig. 3b. The results in Fig. 3, relative to the 14 buses network, have been obtained introducing
uncertainty on the generator inertia and damping coefficients. In particular, the coefficients of generators 1, 3, 5
have been increased by 15% from their nominal value, while the coefficients of generators 2, 4 have been reduced
by 15%. The observer, despite being designed on the basis of the nominal values, is robust with respect to
these uncertainties and correctly estimate the full state of the power network model. The multivariable super
twisting observer, in fact, forces all the error variables to zero simultaneously in finite time. The convergence
to zero happens in approximately 0.06 s and 0.09 s for the 9 and the 14 bus networks respectively.
5.3 Faulty scenario
Different distinct faults, at different load locations, are considered, as shown in Fig. 1. The position, the time
at which they occur and the shape of the introduced faults (fa(t), fb(t), fc(t) for the 9 bus network, fi(t),
fj(t), fk(t) for the 14 bus network) are described in Table 2. Fig. 4 shows the results of the fault identification
and reconstruction procedure in the 9 bus scenario. The faults are represented in Fig. 4a. Fig. 4b shows the
result of the fault identification phase: the fault indicators are different from zero only in the time intervals
when the fault identification procedure is active, that is when condition (36), with  = 1, is satisfied. In each
interval of operation, the unitary indicator determines the faulty channel: for instance, between 2 and 7 seconds
the indicator f1 is unitary. This means that the fault is located in load bus number 1, which, considering the
presence of 3 generators in the network, is bus number 4. As highlighted in Fig. 1a, fa affects bus 4; this
confirms the efficacy of the method. The results of the fault reconstruction procedure are shown in Fig. 4c,
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Table 3: Observer’s performances
9 - bus 0.0521 0.0329
14 - bus 0.0460 0.0380
while the fault reconstruction error is shown in Fig. 4d. The spikes in the error are due to abrupt changes in
the values of the estimated variables. These, however, are almost immediately reduced to zero (the amplitude
is of the order of 1% of the amplitude of the introduced fault).
A similar set of results for the 14 bus network is shown in Fig. 5. The faults are shown in Fig. 5a. Fig. 5b
shows the results of the fault detection procedure: again, during each fault interval, the unitary fault indicator
is the correct one. Between 14 and 18 seconds, for example, the unitary fault indicator is f5: this corresponds
to a fault in the fifth load bus, which is bus 10. Fig. 5c shows the results of the fault reconstruction procedure
and Fig. 5d shows the fault reconstruction error.
5.4 Summary
In order to compare the results obtained with the multivariable super twisting sliding mode observer when
considering the 9 bus and the 14 bus network, the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) value has been used as
a performance index. In particular, considering the fault free simulations presented in Section 5.2, the RMSE
related to the differential states has been computed as:
RMSEd =
1
nd
nd∑
i=1
√√√√1
k
k∑
j=1
(eij)2 (39)
where k is the number of samples in the simulation interval, nd is the number of differential states and eij
is the estimation error of the i-th differential variable at sampling time j. The RMSE value relative to the
algebraic variables (RMSEa) has been computed accordingly. The results obtained, relative to the fault free
simulations, are shown in Table 3. The values of the Root Mean Square Error in Table 3 indicate a high level
of performance when estimating the state of the differential algebraic system of equations. This, together with
a high level of precision in the identification of the faulty channel and in the estimation of the faults, indicates
that the scheme proposed in this paper is highly satisfactory.
6 Conclusion
A fault reconstruction scheme for a class of DAEs representing a power network has been proposed, based on a
multivariable super-twisting sliding mode observer. The approach only requires that a subset of the differential
states (the phase angles of the generators) is measured. Using these measurements the complete state of the
model can be estimated; moreover, an approach to detect, isolate and reconstruct a single failure in any of
the algebraic states (the phase angle of the load bus tension) has been developed. The effectiveness of the
scheme has been assessed considering two IEEE benchmarks. The scheme has been tested by introducing faults
in the channels of the load bus tensions. The simulation results have been analysed and discussed, showing
the high level of effectiveness of the proposed observer based approach. As a first extension of the present
work, the possibility to detect, identify and reconstruct simultaneous failures, occurring at different buses,
could be considered. In addition, a complete analysis of the model parameter uncertainties could be performed.
An additional layer could be added in the fault detection procedure in order to distinguish the effect of load
altering faults from the effect of parameters uncertainties. Finally, as the proposed observer is centralized, the
possibility to design distributed observers, in order to render the approach decentralized and scalable, could be
considered.
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